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Abstract—Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure
biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and
biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible,
unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy
in matching. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent
cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality
sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian
Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Ran-
dom Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed,
these schemes were claimed to be resistant against re-
versibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the
stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against
GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are
severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability
attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical,
reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. The correctness and
practical impact of our attacks are verified over the same
dataset provided by the authors of these two schemes.
Index Terms—Cancelable biometrics; Locality sensitive
hashing; Index-of-Max hashing; Reversibility attack; Au-
thentication attack; Linkability attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics has been widely adopted in authentication
systems, border control mechanisms, financial services,
and healthcare applications. Biometric technologies are
very promising to provide user-friendly, efficient, and
secure solutions to practical problems. In a typical bio-
metric based authentication scheme, users register their
biometric-related information with the system, and they
are authenticated based on a similarity score calculated
from their enrolled biometric data and the fresh biomet-
ric they provide. As a consequence, service providers
need to manage biometric databases. This is somewhat
analogous to storing and managing user passwords in
a password-based authentication scheme. The main dif-
ference is that biometric data serves as a long-term
and unique personal identifier, whence categorized as
a highly sensitive and private data. This is not the
case for passwords as they can be chosen independent
of any user specific characteristics, a single user can
create an independent password per application, and
passwords can be revoked, changed, and renewed easily
at any time. As a result, managing biometric data in
applications is more challenging, and it requires more
care. As biometric-based technologies are deployed at a
larger scale, biometric databases become natural targets
in cyber attacks. In 2015, 5.6 million fingerprints were
stolen from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s
database in a cyber attack [1]. More recently, The
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) said in a
statement that traveler images collected by CBP were
compromised from a subcontractor’s company network
by a malicious cyber-attack on May 31, 2019 [2]. Thus,
biometric protection schemes become a necessity with
the proliferation of biometric applications.
In order to mitigate security and privacy problems
in the use of biometrics, several biometric template
protection methods have been proposed, including can-
celable biometrics, biometric cryptosystems (e.g. fuzzy
extractors), keyed biometrics (e.g. homomorphic encryp-
tion), and hybrid biometrics. In this paper, we focus on
cancelable biometrics (CB), and refer the reader to two
surveys [3], [4] for more details on biometric template
protection methods.
In CB, a biometric template is computed through
a process where the main inputs are biometric data
(e.g. biometric image, or the extracted feature vector)
of a user, and a user specific token (e.g. a random key,
seed, or a password). In a nutshell, templates can be
revoked, changed, and renewed by changing user specific
tokens. For the security of the system, it is important
that the template generation process is non-invertible
(irreversible): given the biometric template and/or the
token of a user, it should be computationally infeasible to
recover any information about the underlying biometric
data. Similarly, given a pair of biometric templates and
the corresponding tokens, it should be computationally
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infeasible to distinguish whether the templates were
derived from the same user (unlinkability). We should
note that even though user specific tokens in CB may
be considered as secret, as part of a two-factor au-
thentication scheme, cryptanalysis of CB with stronger
adversarial models commonly assume that the attacker
knows both the biometric template and the token of a
user. This is a plausible assumption in practice because a
user token may have low entropy (e.g. a weak password),
or it may just be compromised by an attacker. This
scenario is also known as the stolen-token scenario; see
[5].
CB was first propsed by Ratha et al. [6] for face
recognition. Since then, several CB schemes have been
proposed, including the Biohashing algorithm applied on
many modalities such as fingerprints [7], face [8], and
iris [9]. Due to its simple design properties based on
an orthonormal projection matrix, biohashing has been
widely studied [10], [11], [12], [5]. For example, Ratha
et al. proposed three transformations for minutiae-based
fingerprint templates in [13]. Another family of CB has
been proposed based on Bloom filters; see [14].
Several attacks on the biohashing type schemes have
been proposed [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. As mentioned
before, in most of these attacks, it is assumed that
the adversary knows the user specific token, except in
one scenario of [18], which assumes the knowledge of
several biometric templates from several distinct sub-
jects (68 individuals, 105 images per individual, for the
CMUPIE face database; and 350 individuals, 40 images
per individual, for the FRGC face database). In [17],
[18], [19], the attacks are combined with a masquerade
attack. Cryptanalysis efforts have been extended to other
types of CB schemes as well. For example, a Bloom
filters-based protection scheme is analyzed in [20], con-
cerning the non-linkability of templates. The schemes
presented in [13] have been attacked in [21], using the
Attack via Record Multiplicity (ARM) technique, where
the attack uses the knowledge of multiple templates
generated from the original data. ARM is also used by
Li and Hu [22] for attacking several CB schemes that
are designed for minutiae based fingerprint templates, as
proposed in [23], [24].
In summary, CB schemes offer several advantages
such as efficient implementation, high matching accu-
racy, and revocability. On the other hand, security of
CB schemes, in general, are not well understood and
the security claims are rather based on some intuitive,
heuristic, and informal arguments, as opposed to being
based on formal arguments with rigorous proofs.
More recently, Jin et al. [25] proposed two cancelable
biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensi-
tive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM) (see [26] for
details on IoM hashing): Gaussian Random Projection-
IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-
IoM (URP-IoM). It is shown in [25] that, for suitably
chosen parameters, GRP-IoM and URP-IoM are robust
against variation and noise in the measurement of data.
It is also claimed in [25] that, GRP-IoM and URP-
IoM are resistant against reversibility, authentication, and
linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario.
In this paper, we formalize some security notions
under the stolen token scenario and propose several
attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM. We argue that
both schemes are severely vulnerable against authenti-
cation and linkability attacks. We also propose better,
but not yet practical, reversibility attacks for GRP-IoM.
We utilize linear and geometric programming methods
in our attacks. Their correctness and practical impact are
verified over the same dataset provided by the authors
of these two schemes. In order to be more specific, we
state the security claims in [25] and our cryptanalysis
results as follows:
1) Reversibility attack: In a reversibility attack, an
adversary, who already has the knowledge of a
user’s specific token, and has at least one biometric
template of the same user, tries to recover a feature
vector, that corresponds to the user’s biometric
data.
Analysis in [25]: It is claimed in [25] that the
best template reversing strategy for an adversary
is to exhaustively search feature vectors. Based
on some entropy analysis of the feature vectors,
it is concluded in [25] that recovering the exact
feature vectors from their system implemented
over the FVC 2002 DB1 dataset requires 23588
operations for both GRP-IoM and URP-IoM; see
Section VII.A in [25]. In fact, the attack cost
in [25] was underestimated as (212)299 = 23588
because of underestimating 4636 as 212. A more
accurate analysis yields a cost of 4636299 ≈ 23641.
Our results: We propose a new reversibility attack
against GRP-IoM. The main idea is to reduce the
search space by guessing the sign of the com-
ponents of the feature vectors with high success
probability. Our analysis and experiments over the
FVC 2002 DB1 dataset suggest that recovering
GRP-IoM feature vectors now requires 23466 op-
erations. Even though our attack is not practical,
it reduces the previously estimated security level
for GRP-IoM by 3641 − 3433 = 208 bits from
3641-bit to 3433-bit. Furthermore, we relax the
exact reversibility notion to the nearby reversibility
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notion. This relaxation is reasonable given the fact
that different measurements of the same user’s
biometric produce different feature vectors due
to the inherent noise in the measurements. Un-
der this relaxation, we propose successful attack
strategies against GRP-IoM. Currently, we do not
have any reversing attack strategy against URP-
IoM that works better than the naive exhaustive
search or random guessing strategies. For more
details, please see Section IV-B.
2) Authentication attack: In an authentication at-
tack, an adversary, who already has the knowledge
of a user’s specific token, and has at least one
biometric template of the same user, tries to gen-
erate a feature vector such that the adversary can
now use that feature vector and the stolen token
to be (falsely) authenticated by the system as a
legitimate user. Note that authentication attacks are
weaker than reversibility attacks because feature
vectors generated in the attacks are not required
to correspond to actual biometrics.
Analysis in [25]: The authors in [25] analyze
several authentication attack strategies (brute force,
record multiplicity, false acceptance, birthday)
against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM. In particular, the
analysis in [25] yields that authentication attacks
against GRP-IoM with parameters m = 300, q =
16, τ = 0.06, and URP-IoM with parameters
m = 600, k = 128, τ = 0.11 require 242 and
2252 operations, respectively, when the underlying
dataset is FVC 2002 DB1; see Table V in [25].
Our results: We utilize linear and geometric pro-
gramming methods and propose new and practical
authentication attacks against both GRP-IoM and
URP-IoM. For example, we verify that our attacks
against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM (under the same
parameters and the dataset as above) run in the
order of seconds and can authenticate adversaries
successfully. We also show that the cancellability
property of both GRP-IoM and URP-IoM are
violated in the sense that adversaries can still be
(falsely) authenticated by the system even after
user templates are revoked and tokens are renewed.
For more details, please see Section IV-A and V-A.
3) Linkability attack: In a linkability attack, an
adversary, who is given a pair of biometric tem-
plates, tries to determine whether the templates
were generated from two distinct individuals or
from the same individual using two distinct tokens.
Analysis in [25]: Based on some experimen-
tal analysis of the pseudo-genuine and pseudo-
imposter score distributions, and the large overlap
between the two distributions, it is concluded in
[25] that an adversary cannot be successful in a
linkability attack against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM;
see Section VII C in [25].
Our results: Unlinkability claims in [25] are
limited in the sense that the analysis only takes into
account the attack strategies based on correlating
the similarity scores of given templates. Therefore,
the analysis in [25] does not rule out other, po-
tentially better, attack strategies. In our analysis,
we exploit partial reversibility of GRP-IoM and
URP-IoM, and propose successful attack strate-
gies (distinguishers) against both schemes. More
specifically, the distinguisher for GRP-IoM uses a
preimage finder along with a correlation metric,
that counts the number of identically signed com-
ponents in the preimages. As a result, our attack
can correctly link two templates 97 percent of
the time. The distinguisher for URP-IoM uses a
preimage finder along with the Pearson correlation
metric, and that can correctly link two templates
83 percent of the time. For more details, please
see Section VI.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. We provide some background information on
GRP-IoM and URP-IoM in Section II. In Section II, we
also formalize some of the concepts for a more rigorous
discussion and analysis of our attacks. We provide our
attack models and relevant definitions in Section III. Our
attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM are explicitly
described and evaluated in Section IV, V, and VI. We
derive our conclusions in Section VII.
II. FORMALIZING CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC
SCHEMES
Biometric templates in GRP-IoM and URP-IoM are
constructed in two steps: (1) Feature extraction: A
feature vector is derived from a biometric image; and
(2) Transformation: A user specific secret is used to
transform the user’s feature vector to a template. In
this section, we present formal descriptions of these two
steps and show how GRP-IoM and URP-IoM can be
seen as concrete instantiations of our formal definitions.
Our formalization will later help us to describe security
notions, and to present our cryptanalysis of GRP-IoM
and URP-IoM in a rigorous manner.
A. Feature Extraction and Template Generation
In the following, we let (MA, DA) and (MB , DB)
be two metric spaces, whereMA andMB represent the
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feature space and template space, respectively; and DA
and DB are the respective distance functions.
Definition 1: A biometric feature extraction scheme is
a pair of deterministic polynomial time algorithms Π :=
(E, V ), where
• E is the feature extractor of the system, that takes
biometric data b as input, and returns a feature
vector x ∈MA.
• V is the verifier of the system, that takes two feature
vectors x = E(b), x′ = E(b′), and a threshold τA
as input, and returns True if DA(x, x′) ≤ τA, and
returns False if DA(x, x′) > τA.
Remark 1: V is not explicitly used in GRP-IoM and
URP-IoM. More specifically, after a feature vector x is
extracted from a biometric image b, a transformation is
applied to x and a biometric template is derived. There-
fore, the feature vector x is not used in the protocol.
The main reason that we introduce V and DA here is
to capture the notion of a vector x′, that is close to
the feature vector x. For example, the pair x and x′
may represent the feature vectors of the same individual
extracted from two different measurements b and b′; in
which case, one would expect V to return True for
relatively small values of τA. As a second example, x′
may be the feature vector constructed by an attacker
to reverse the biometric template of an individual with
biometric image b. In this case, one may measure the
success of the attack as a function of τA, and the rate
of True values returned by V . A successful attack is
expected to result in higher return rates of True for
relatively small values of τA.
Remark 2: In this paper, we consider two different
methods to quantify the similarity between feature vec-
tors in the GRP-IoM and URP-IoM schemes. The first
one is the Euclidean distance, where one computes
d = DA(x, x
′) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)2,
and the verifier V returns True if d ≤ τEuc, and returns
False if d > τEuc. In the second method, on computes
s = S(x, x′) =
∑n
i=1 xi × x′i∑n
i=1 x
2
i + x
′2
i
,
and the verifier V returns True if s ≥ τSim, and returns
False if s < τSim. The reason for using the first method
is that Euclidean distance is commonly deployed in
biometrics, and the reason for using the second method
is that it has been recently argued to be a successful
measure in [25], [27].
Definition 2: Let K be token (seed) space, representing
the set of tokens to be assigned to users. A cancelable
biometric scheme is a tuple of deterministic polynomial
time algorithms Ξ := (G, T ,V), where
• G is the secret parameter generator of the system,
that takes a token (seed) s ∈ K as input, and returns
a secret parameter set sp.
• T is the transformation of the system, that takes a
feature vector x ∈ MA, and the secret parameter
set sp as input, and returns a biometric template
u = T (sp, x) ∈MB .
• V is the verifier of the system, that takes two
biometric templates u = T (sp, x), u′ = T (sp′, x′),
and a threshold τB as input; and returns True if
DB(u, u
′) ≤ τB , and returns False if DB(u, u′) >
τB .
B. GRP-IoM and URP-IoM Schemes
The feature extractor E, which is common for both
GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, takes fingerprint images as
input, and generates feature vectors of length 299, that
is MA = Rn with n = 299.
Let Ia = Z∩ [1, a] denote the set of integers from 1 to
a. In [25], GRP-IoM sets MB = (Iq)m, and URP-IoM
sets MB = (Ik)m, for some suitable parameters k, m,
and q. In the rest of this paper, we unify this notation
and useMB = (Ik)m for both GRP-IoM and URP-IoM.
In both GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, the distance between
two templates, DB(u, u′), is defined as the Hamming
distance between u and u′. Therefore, in the rest of this
paper, we use DH instead of DB .
Both GRP-IoM and URP-IoM use an Index-of-Max
operation, denoted IoM , in their verification algorithm
V . IoM(v) is the smallest index, at which v attains its
maximum value. The algorithms G and T for GRP-IoM
and URP-IoM significantly differ, and we explain them
in the following.
a) GRP-IoM Instantiation:
• G takes the seed s as input, and generates random
Gaussian n-by-k matrices Wi = [w1 · · ·wk], for
i = 1, . . . ,m. The column vectors of the matrices
are sampled as standard Gaussian vectors of length-
n: wj ←$N (0, In) for j = 1, . . . , k. As a result, the
secret parameter set sp consists of the sequence of
projections W1, . . . ,Wm.
• T takes the secret parameter set {W1, . . . ,Wm},
and a fingerprint feature vector x ∈ Rn as input,
and computes
1) v ← xWi,
2) ui ← IoM(v),
for i = 1, . . . ,m. The output of T is the biometric
template u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ (Ik)m.
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• V takes two biometric templates u, u′ ∈ (Ik)m, and
a matching threshold 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 as input; computes
d = DH(u′, u); and returns True if d/m ≤ 1 −
τ , and returns False if d/m > 1 − τ . Note that
τ represents the minimum rate of the number of
indices with the same entry in the pair of vectors
to be accepted as a genuine pair.
The GRP-based IoM Hashing is depicted Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Transformation of the GRP-based IoM scheme.
b) Concrete parameters: In [25], several experi-
ments are performed to select optimal parameters k and
m. More specifically, accuracy of the system is ana-
lyzed for k ∈ {2, 3, 5, 10, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 299},
and m ∈ {2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. It is
concluded that large m is necessary for better accuracy,
and that the effect of k on the accuracy is not significant
when m is sufficiently large. For example, changing
the configuration from (k,m) = (2, 300) to (k,m) =
(250, 300) changes the equal error rate (EER) of the
system from 0.26% to 0.24%, a minor improvement of
0.02%. As a result, the parameter set (k,m) = (16, 300)
is commonly referred in the security and performance
analysis of GRP-IoM in [25] with τ ∈ {0.01, 0.06}; see
Table IV and Table V in [25]. For convenient comparison
of our results, we also use (k,m) = (16, 300) and
τ ∈ {0.01, 0.06} as the main reference point in our
security analysis in this paper.
c) URP-IoM Instantiation: Let Sn be the sym-
metric group of all permutations σ = (σ(1), . . . , σ(n))
on (1, . . . , n). Let Sn,k = {σ = (σ(1), . . . , σ(k)) :
σ ∈ Sn} denote the set of partial permutations for
k ≤ n. In other words, permutations in Sn,k are
obtained by restricting permutations in Sn to the first
k integers 1, 2, ..., k. For σ ∈ Sn,k and x = (x1, ..., xn),
we denote σ(x) = (xσ(1), ..., xσ(k)). As an example,
for n = 5 and k = 3, restricting the permutation
(3, 5, 1, 2, 4) ∈ S5 to S5,3 yields σ = (3, 5, 1) ∈ S5,3,
and we get σ((x1, x2, x3, x4, x5)) = (x3, x5, x1). Fi-
nally, the component-wise (Hadamard) product of two
vectors x = (x1, ..., xn) and y = (y1, ..., yn) is denoted
by x  y = (x1 · y1, ..., xn · yn). The secret parameter
generation, transformation, and verification operations in
URP-IoM are performed as follows:
• G takes the seed s as input, and generates
partial permutations Pij uniformly at random:
Pij ←$Sn,k for i = 1, . . . ,m, and j = 1, ..., p.
As a result, the secret parameter set sp con-
sists of the sequence of partial permutations
{(P11, . . . ,P1p), . . . , (Pm1, . . . ,Pmp)}.
• T takes the secret parameter set
{(P11, . . . ,P1p), . . . , (Pm1, . . . ,Pmp)}, and a
fingerprint feature vector x ∈ Rn as input, and
computes
1) vj ← Pij(x) for j = 1, . . . , p,
2) ui ← IoM(v1  · · ·  vp),
for i = 1, ...,m. The output of T is the biometric
template u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ (Ik)m.
• V takes two biometric templates u, u′ ∈ (Ik)m, and
a matching threshold 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 as input; computes
d = DH(u′, u); and returns True if d/m ≤ 1 −
τ , and returns False if d/m > 1 − τ . Note that
τ represents the minimum rate of the number of
indices with the same entry in the pair of vectors
to be accepted as a genuine pair.
An illustration of the URP-based IoM transformation
is given Figure 2.
d) Concrete parameters: In [25], several experi-
ments are performed to select optimal parameters k,
m, and p. It is reported that, the best performance
over the FVC 2002 DB1 dataset is achieved when
(k,m, p) = (128, 600, 2) and τ = 0.11. This parameter
set is also referred in the security and performance
analysis of URP-IoM in [25]; see Table V in [25].
For convenient comparison of our results, we also use
(k,m, p) = (128, 600, 2) and τ = 0.11 as the main
reference point in our security analysis in this paper.
III. STOLEN TOKEN ATTACK MODELS
Let U be the set of users of the biometric system. We
identify a user with its biometric characteristic, and de-
fine a function BC(·) that takes a biometric characteristic
usr ∈ U as input, and outputs a digital representation of
biometric data b; for instance, the scan of a fingerprint.
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Fig. 2. Transformation of the URP-based IoM scheme for p = 2.
Note that for two different computations of b = BC(usr)
and b′ = BC(usr) (e.g. at different times, or different
devices), we may have b 6= b′ due to the inherent noise in
the measurement of biometric data. Therefore, we model
BC(·) as a probabilistic polynomial time function. We
also allow BC(usr1) = BC(usr2) for usr1 6= usr2 due
to the error rates of recognition systems. In the following,
we use x←$M to indicate that x is chosen from the set
M uniformly at random.
A. Reversibility attacks
Let x ∈ MA be a feature vector, and let u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈ MB be the template generated from x
and the secret parameter set sp. In a reversibility attack,
an adversary is given u, sp, and a threshold value τA,
and the adversary tries to find a feature vector x∗ ∈MA
such that x∗ is exactly the same as x, or x∗ is close to
x with respect to the distance function over MA and
the threshold value τA. In this case, we say that x∗
is a τA-nearby-feature preimage (or simply a nearby-
feature preimage, when τA is clear from the context) of
the template u. More formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 3: Let x ∈ MA be a feature vector, and
u = Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈ MB for some secret parameter
set sp. Let τA be a threshold value. A nearby-feature
preimage of u with respect to sp is a feature vector
x∗ ∈MA such that Π.V (x, x∗, τA) = True.
As a result, an adversary A in a reversibility attack
can be modelled as an algorithm that takes sp and u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) as input, and that outputs x∗ = A(sp, u) ∈
MA. We say that the adversary A is succeesful, if x∗ is
a nearby-feature preimage of u. More formally, we have
the following definition.
Definition 4: Let Ξ be a cancelable biometric protec-
tion scheme and A an adversary for a nearby-feature
preimage attack. The success rate of A, denoted by
RateRevA , is defined as:
Pr

Π.V (x, x∗, τA) = True
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
usr←$U ; s←$K;
b← BC(usr);
x← Π.E(b);
sp← Ξ.G(s);
u← Ξ.T (sp, x);
x∗ ← A(sp, u);

.
Note that an adversary can follow a naive strategy by
simply sampling a user usr∗ from U and returning x∗ =
BC(usr∗). Under this strategy, the adversary would be
expected to succeed with probability FAR(τA), which
is the false accept rate of the system with respect to
U and τA as the threshold value for the comparison of
the pairs of feature vectors. A weakness of the scheme,
with respect to the reversibility notion, would require
better attack strategies, and this motivates the following
definition.
Definition 5: The protection scheme Ξ is said to be
reversible with advantage AdvRev(A), if there exists
an adversary A such that |RateRevA − FAR(τA)| ≥
AdvRev(A). If AdvRev(A) is negligible for all A, then
we say that Ξ is irreversible in the stolen token scenario.
In particular, a protection scheme Ξ is irreversible
in the stolen token scenario if, the success rate of any
adversary A is not significantly better than the success
rate of the strategy of drawing x∗ randomly from MA.
Remark 3: Definitions 4 and 5 can be generalized to
the case where the pair (token, template) is renewed N
times. The adversary thus takes advantage of N pairs of
(token, template), with N > 1.
B. Authentication attacks
Let x ∈ MA be a feature vector, and let u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈MB be the template generated from x and
the secret parameter set sp. In an authentication attack,
an adversary is given u, sp, and a threshold value τB ,
and the adversary tries to find a feature vector x∗ ∈MA
such that for u∗ = Ξ.T (sp, x∗), u∗ is exactly the same
as u, or u∗ is close to u with respect to the distance
function over MB and the threshold value τB . In this
case, we say that x∗ is a τB-nearby-template preimage
(or simply a nearby-template preimage, when τB is clear
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from the context) of the template u. More formally, we
have the following definition.
Definition 6: Let x ∈ MA be a feature vector, and
u = Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈ MB for some secret parameter
set sp. Let τB be a threshold value. A nearby-template
preimage of u with respect to sp is a feature vector
x∗ such that u∗ = Ξ.T (sp, x∗) and Ξ.V(u, u∗, τB) =
True.
As a result, an adversary A in an authentication attack
can be modelled as an algorithm that takes sp and u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) as input, and that outputs x∗ = A(sp, u) ∈
MA. We say that the adversary A is succeesful if x∗
is a nearby-template preimage of u. More formally, we
have the following definition.
Definition 7: Let Ξ be a cancelable biometric protec-
tion scheme and A an adversary for finding a nearby-
template preimage. The success rate of A, denoted by
RateAuthA , is defined as:
Pr

Ξ.V(u, u∗, τB) = True
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
usr←$U ; s←$K;
b← BC(usr);
x← Π.E(b);
sp← Ξ.G(s);
u← Ξ.T (sp, x);
x∗ ← A(sp, u);
u∗ ← Ξ.T (sp, x∗);

.
Note that an adversary can follow a naive strategy
by simply sampling a user usr∗ from U and returning
x∗ = BC(usr∗). Under this strategy, the adversary
would be expected to succeed with probability FAR(τB),
which is the false accept rate of the system with respect
to U and τB as the threshold value for the comparison of
the pairs of templates. This strategy is also commonly
known as the false acceptance rate attack in the liter-
ature. A weakness of the scheme, with respect to the
false authentication notion, would require better attack
strategies, and this motivates the following definition.
Definition 8: The protection scheme Ξ is said to
have false authentication with advantage AdvAuth(A)
property, if there exists an adversary A such that
|RateAuthA −FAR(τB)| ≥ AdvAuth(A). If AdvAuth(A)
is negligible for all A, then we say that Ξ does not
have false authentication property under the stolen token
scenario.
In particular, a protection scheme Ξ does not have
false authentication property under the stolen token
scenario, if the success rate of any adversary A is not
significantly better than the success rate of the strategy
of drawing x∗ randomly from MA; or in other words,
the success rate of any attack is bounded by the false
acceptance rate of the system.
Now, suppose that an adversary knows the secret
parameter set sp of a user (usr), and the template
u = Ξ.T (sp, x) of the user, where x = Π.E(BC(usr)).
At this point, the user may renew her token, or register
to another system with a new token and a freshly
acquired feature vector. Suppose now that the adversary
knows the user’s new secret parameter set sp′, but
the adversary does not know the user’s new template
u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′). In such a scenario, the adversary
would try to compute a nearby-template preimage x∗ of
the template u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′), given sp, u, and sp′. In-
formally, we call such a nearby-template preimage x∗ as
a long-lived nearby-template preimage. More formally,
we have the following definition.
Definition 9: Let Ξ be a cancelable biometric pro-
tection scheme and A an adversary for finding a long-
lived nearby-template preimage. The success rate of A,
denoted by RateAuth-``A , is defined as:
Pr

Ξ.V(u′, u′∗, τB) = True
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
usr←$U ;
b← BC(usr);
b′ ← BC(usr);
x← Π.E(b);
x′ ← Π.E(b′);
s←$K; s′←$K;
sp← Ξ.G(s);
sp′ ← Ξ.G(s′);
u← Ξ.T (sp, x);
u′ ← Ξ.T (sp′, x′);
x∗ ← A(sp, sp′, u);
u′∗ ← Ξ.T (sp′, x∗);

.
Note that an adversary can follow a naive strategy
by simply sampling a user usr∗ from U and returning
x∗ = BC(usr∗). Under this strategy, the adversary
would be expected to succeed with probability FAR(τB),
as explained in the previous authentication attack model.
A weakness of the scheme, with respect to the long-lived
false authentication notion, would require better attack
strategies, and this motivates the following definition.
Definition 10: The protection scheme Ξ is said
to have long-lived false authentication with advantage
AdvAuth−``(A) property, if there exists an adversary A
such that |RateAuth−``A −FAR(τB)| ≥ AdvAuth−``(A).
If AdvAuth−``(A) is negligible for all A, then we say
that Ξ does not have long-lived false authentication
property under the stolen token scenario.
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In other words, a protection scheme Ξ is vulnerable
to long-lived nearby-template preimage attacks if an
adversary, who knows a user’s previous token and tem-
plate pair, and the user’s renewed token, can construct
a feature vector that can be (falsely) authenticated by
the system with some probability greater than the false
accept rate of the system.
Remark 4: We should emphasize that in finding long-
lived nearby-template preimages, we allow the adversary
to know sp, u, and sp′, but we do not allow the adversary
to know u′. Therefore, the finding a long-lived nearby-
template preimage problem is not easier than the finding
a nearby-template preimage problem. This observation
also makes sense in practice as explained in the follow-
ing. Consider an adversary, who has access to an efficient
algorithm for finding nearby-template preimages. Such
an adversary can be blocked by revoking biometric
templates and renewing tokens. On the other hand, an
adversary, who has access to an efficient algorithm for
finding long-lived nearby-template preimages, can still
be (falsely) authenticated by the system even after user
templates are revoked and tokens are renewed. In other
words, a successful algorithm for finding long-lived
nearby-template preimages would defeat the purpose of
cancellability feature of a system.
Remark 5: Definitions 9 and 10 can be generalized
to the case where the pair (token, template) is renewed
N times. The adversary thus takes advantage of the N
first leaked pairs of (token, template), along with the
(N + 1)’th token.
C. Linkability attacks
Let x, x′ ∈ MA be two feature vectors. Let u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈ MB and u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′) ∈ MB be
two templates generated from x and x′, and the secret
parameters set sp and sp′. In a linkability attack, an
adversary is given sp, sp′, u, and u′, and the adversary
tries to find out whether x and x′ are derived from the
same user. As a result, an adversary A in a linkability
attack can be modelled as an algorithm that takes sp,
sp′, u, and u′ as input, and that outputs 0 or 1, where
the output 1 indicates that the feature vectors x and
x′ are extracted from the same user, and the output 0
indicates that the feature vectors x and x′ are extracted
from two different users. We say that the adversary A is
successful, if his conclusion (whether the feature vectors
are extracted from the same user) is indeed correct. More
formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 11: Let Ξ be a cancelable biometric
protection scheme and A an adversary for a linkability
attack. The success rate of A, denoted by RateLinkA , is
defined as:
Pr

c′ = c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
usr←$U ;
b← BC(usr); x← Π.E(b);
s←$K; sp← Ξ.G(s);
s′←$K; sp′ ← Ξ.G(s′);
c←$ {0, 1};
usr′ ← usr if c = 0;
usr′←$U \ usr if c = 1;
b′←$BC(usr′); x′ ← Π.E(b′);
u← Ξ.T (sp, x);u′ ← Ξ.T (sp′, x′);
c′ ← A(sp, u, sp′, u′);

.
Note that an adversary can follow a naive strategy
by simply sampling a value from {0, 1} uniformly at
random. Under this strategy, the adversary would be
expected to succeed with probability 1/2. This strategy
is also known as the guessing attack in the literature. A
weakness of the scheme, with respect to the linkability
notion, would require better attack strategies, and this
motivates the following definition.
Definition 12: The protection scheme Ξ is said to be
linkable (distinguishable) with advantage AdvLink(A),
if there exists an adversary A such that |RateLinkA −
1/2| ≥ AdvLink(A). If AdvLink(A) is negligible for all
A, then we say that Ξ is unlinkable (indistinguishable)
under the stolen token scenario.
IV. ATTACKS ON GRP-IOM
In this section, we propose some concrete attack
strategies against GRP-IoM, and evaluate the impact of
our attacks through our implementation over one of the
datasets as provided in [25]. More specifically, we use
the dataset of features extracted from the fingerprint
images of FVC2002-DB1 as in [25]. This dataset
contains a total of 500 samples: 5 samples per user for
100 users.
As mentioned before, for convenient comparison of
our results, we use the GRP-IoM paramaters n = 299,
(k,m) = (16, 300) and τ ∈ {0.01, 0.06} as the main
reference point in our security analysis, because these
parameters are commonly referred in the security and
performance analysis of GRP-IoM; see Table IV and
Table V in [25].
A. Authentication attacks on GRP-IoM
Finding nearby-template preimages: As before,
let x ∈ MA = Rn be a feature vector, and let
u = Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈MB = Rm be the template generated
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from x and the secret parameter set sp. Assume that
an adversary A knows u and sp. In order to find a
nearby-template preimage vector x∗ ∈ Rn, the adversary
proceeds as follows. Since A knows sp, A can recover
the set of Gaussian random projections in GRP-IoM:
A = {Wi ∈ Rk×n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} Let the rows of
Wi be denoted by Wi,1, Wi,2, ..., Wi,k. Let 〈Wi,j , x〉
denote the inner product between the vectors Wi,j and
x. Recall that the template produced by GRP-IoM is a
vector u = (u1, u2, . . . , um) ∈ (Zk)m comprised of the
indices of maximum, i.e.
ui = argmax
j s.t. 1≤j≤k
〈Wi,j , x〉 for i = 1 . . .m,
from which A recovers the set of inequalities
{〈Wi,j , x′〉 ≤ 〈Wi,ui , x′〉}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤k. (1)
As a result, A obtains (k− 1)m inequalities in n un-
knowns, and sets x∗ to be one of the (arbitrary) solutions
of this system (possibly imposing |x∗i | ≤ c for some c
positive, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m). By the construction of x∗, we
must have u∗ = Ξ.T (sp, x∗) = Ξ.T (sp, x) = u, and so
Ξ.V(u, u∗, τB) = True, for all τB . In other words, A
is expected to get (falsely) authenticated by the server
with 100%, or equivalently, RateAuthA = 100%. The
expected success rate of our attack has been verified in
our python implementation using the cvxopt library [28]
on a computer running on Ubuntu 17.10 with xfce
environment, with an i7 4790k 4 Ghz processor, an 8
GB of RAM, a SATA SSD of 512GB. The attack runs
in the order of seconds for the parameters n = 299,
(k,m) = (16, 300) and τ ∈ {0.01, 0.06}.
Finding long-lived nearby-template preimages:
Let x and x′ be two feature vectors of the same user,
and sp and sp′ two secret parameters sets. Let u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) and u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′). In finding a long-
lived nearby-template preimage x∗ of u′, we assume
that the adversary A knows u, sp, sp′. In our proposed
attack, A follows the previously described strategy to
find a nearby-template preimage x∗ based on u and sp,
and presents this x∗ as a candidate for nearby-template
preimage of u′.
We evaluate this attack by computing both the average
and the minimum matching score, over one hundred
users, between u′∗ = Ξ.T (sp′, x∗) and the re-enrolled
genuine template u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′). Our experiments
yield 44.6% as the average rate of the number of indices
with the same entry in u′ and u′∗; and 17.7% as the
minimum rate of the number of indices with the same
entry in u′ and u′∗. Therefore, given the matching
score thresholds of τ ∈ {0.01, 0.06} as set in [25],
we expect that the success rate of the adversary to
be RateAuth−``A = 100%. The above attack strategies
show that GRP-IoM is severely vulnerable against au-
thentication attacks under the stolen token and template
attack model, and also show that adversaries cannot be
prevented by renewing templates or tokens. In other
words, the cancalleability feature of GRP-IoM is violated
under the stolen token and template scenario.
Optimizing authentication attacks: Next, we ex-
plore whether the attacks can be optimized when a user
leaks several token and template pairs. More specifically,
assume that an adversary captures N token, template
pairs (spi, u(i)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , derived from the same
feature vector x. In practice, these pairs may correspond
to different enrollments of the user for N different
services using the same biometric image. Assume further
that the adversary is in the possession of another token
spN+1, but not the template u(N+1), from the (N+1)’st
enrollment of the user with same feature vector x.
Let us denote by Aspi the sets of matrices derived
from the token spi. The adversary can either keep all cor-
responding sets of inequalities, or selectively choose the
inequalities of the system to decrease both the memory
usage and the running time to refine the solution. In the
following, we denote by AGRPAC the attack consisting of
using all the constraints, and by AGRPSC the attack where
the constraints are selected. The attack AGRPSC proceeds
as follows:
1) First, compute an approximated solution x′ from
the pair (u(1), Asp1), and initialize a set of con-
straints
S =
〈Wsp1i,j −Wsp1i,u(1)i , x〉 ≤ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 ≤ i ≤ m
1 ≤ j ≤ k
j 6= usp1i
 .
2) For b = 2 . . . N , the following computations are
performed:
a) u′ = (u′1, . . . , u′m) where u′i =
argmaxl s.t. 1≤l≤k〈Wspbi,l , x′〉 for i = 1 . . .m.
b) d = u′ − u(b) = (d1, . . . , dm), a vector of
differences.
c) The set S of constraints is updated as
S∪
〈W
spb
i,j −Wspbi,u(b)i , x〉 ≤ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
di 6= 0
1 ≤ i ≤ m
1 ≤ j ≤ k
j 6= u(b)i
 .
d) x′ is updated subject to the constraints of S.
3) Return x′.
Recall that the dataset in [25] contains 5 samples
(genuine feature vectors) for each user. Therefore, in
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our experiments, we consider 2 ≤ N ≤ 4. We use
linear programming solver of the SciPy optimization
library in Python. The linprog function is parameter-
ized with the ’interior-point’ solver method, with upper
bounds (1) and lower bounds (-1) for the components
of seeked solutions, and without objective function. The
experiments yield the results of Table I and Table II,
showing an improvement of the matching scores over
the previous attacks (for N = 1). Table I reports on
the matching scores obtained by an attacker AGRPAC ; and
Table II reports on the matching scores obtained by an
attacker AGRPSC , optimizing the number of constraints.
TABLE I
MATCHING SCORES USING AGRPAC .
N 2 3 4
Constr. Number
(N · (k − 1) ·m+ 2 · n) 9,598 14,098 18,598
GRP Match. Score – Min (%) 27.7 33 38
GRP Match. Score – Avg (%) 50.6 53.4 56
TABLE II
MATCHING SCORES USING AGRPSC .
N 2 3 4
Constr. Number – Avg 3,281 3,832 4,351
GRP Match. Score – Min (%) 29.3 29.7 38.3
GRP Match. Score – Avg (%) 48.4 50.6 52.8
B. Reversibility attacks on GRP-IoM
In authentication attacks in the previous section, ad-
versarial strategies focus on finding nearby-template
preimages x∗, that are not required to be close to the
actual feature vector x. In a reversibility attack, an
adversary finds a nearby-feature preimage x∗, and the
quality of the attack is measured by the closeness of x∗
to x.
Exact reversibility: The best case for an attacker
is to have x∗ = x. In [25], it is argued that the best
strategy for an attacker to find x∗ = x is to exhaustively
search (guess) the components of x. Given the feature
vectors extracted from FVC2002-DB1, it is reported
in [25] that the minimum and maximum values of
the feature vector components are −0.2504 and 0.2132
respectively. Therefore, the search space for a feature
component consists of 4636 possibilities, including the
positive and negative signed components. Moreover, the
fetaure vectors in GRP-IoM are of length 299. Therefore,
it is concluded in [25] that the attack requires to exhaust
a search space of size 4636299 ≈ 23641. In the following,
we propose a better attack strategy to recover x. The
main idea is to guess the sign of the components of the
feature vector, and shrink the search space accordingly.
Given a token, template pair of a user, the adversary
computes a nearby-template preimage x∗, and guesses
the sign of xi as the same as the sign of x∗i . If all
the signs were correctly guessed by the adversary, then
the size of the search space would be reduced from
4636299 ≈ 23641 to (4636/2)299 ≈ 23342. However,
the adversary may guess the signs incorrectly. Based
on our experiments, where we compare the sign of the
components of the preimage vectors x∗ and the actual
feature vectors x, we estimate that the probabilty of
guessing the sign correctly per component is 242/299.
Therefore, we estimate the size of the search space for x
as (4636/2)299 ·(299/242)299 ≈ 23433. Even though our
attack is not practical, it reduces the previously estimated
security level for GRP-IoM by 3641− 3433 = 208 bits
from 3641-bit to 3433-bit.
Nearby reversibility: Now, we analyze some at-
tack strategies for finding a nearby-feature preimage of
a template under the stolen token attack scenario. The
adversary proceeds similarly as in the authentication
attacks, except that now we also include some objective
functions, and solve a linearly constrained quadratic
optimization problem. We consider three cases for which
the objective functions are given as follows:
1) min ‖x‖22.
2) min ‖x − vm‖22 where vm is the average feature
vector in the database provided in [25]. For our
experiments, one sample per user is attacked, i.e.
one hundred linear programs are solved.
3) min ‖x−vr‖22 where vr is a feature vector derived
from a fingerprint of the adversary. For our exper-
iments, vr is picked at random among the samples
of one user. These samples are then removed from
the database. Among the remaining 99×5 samples,
one sample per user is attacked, for a total of 99
program solvings.
In our experiments, we use Python and the CVX-
OPT package [28] which provides linearly constrained
quadratic programming solvers. We measure the suc-
cess rate of this attack strategy RaterevA , and report
its advantage over the false accept rate of the system.
We compute two reference false accept rate values for
the dataset provided in [25], one with respect to the
Euclidean distance, and one with respect to the simi-
larity measure as described in Remark 2. We compute
FAR(τEuc) = FRR(τEuc) = 0.03 using the Euclidean
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distance, with the threshold τEuc = 0.33. We estimate
FAR(τSim) = FAR(τSim) = 0.002 using the similarity
measure, with the threshold τSim = 0.13. Our attacks
are evaluated in three cases: the cases 1, 2 and 3 when
an objective function is used in the order as mentioned
above, and the case none when no optimization function
is used. Results of our experiments, as summarized in
Table III and Table IV, show that in most cases the
solving of an optimization problem leads to a RaterevA
significantly greater that FAR(τA). We then conclude
that GRP-IoM is reversible with a single complete leak,
both considering the Euclidean distance and the dedi-
cated matching score of [27].
TABLE III
SUCCESS RATE OF THE REVERSIBILITY ATTACK AGAINST
GRP-IOM UNDER SINGLE STOLEN TOKEN AND TEMPLATE ATTACK;
USING THE EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE AND FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF
τA .
Objective Function (case) none 1 2 3
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.33 2 63 77 98
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.2 0 3 4 27.2
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.15 0 0 0 5
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.1 0 0 0 0
TABLE IV
SUCCESS RATE OF THE REVERSIBILITY ATTACK AGAINST
GRP-IOM UNDER SINGLE STOLEN TOKEN AND TEMPLATE ATTACK;
USING THE SIMILARITY MEASURE WITH THE THRESHOLD
τSim = 0.13.
Objective Function (case) none 1 2 3
RaterevA , τSim = 0.13 100 0 0 100
Table III also shows that an adversary’s success rate
drops when Euclidean distance threshold τEuc is lowered
from 0.33 in the system, as expected. In Table IV, we
perform a similar analysis when the similarity measure
is used with the threshold τSim = 0.13. We observe that
the best adversarial success rates are obtained when no
objective function is used, or the objective function in
case 3 is used. The effect of multiple stolen token and
template pairs is evaluated for the previously mentioned
four cases, the results of which are presented in the
Table V and VI. When no function is optimized, we
see the success rate is increasing with the number of
stolen pairs, up to 3 pairs, after which it decreases. This
decrease may be due to the variability of the feature
vector components at each re-enrollement of the user,
i.e. when a renewal of the token is required. Since
each system of constraints that we add to the linear
program corresponds to a re-enrollment, the amount of
errors in the constants of the inequalities may exceed
the benefit of having more inequalities. Finally, when an
objective function is added in the program solving, our
experiments show there is no value gained with multiple
leaks. We should note that our experiments are rather
limited due to the sample size. For better and more
definitive conclusions, one would need to perform more
experiments.
TABLE V
SUCCESS RATE OF THE REVERSIBILITY ATTACK AGAINST
GRP-IOM UNDER N STOLEN TOKEN AND TEMPLATE ATTACKS
WHEN NO OPTIMIZATION IS PERFORMED (CASE none), USING THE
EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE AND FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF τA .
N 1 2 3 4 5
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.33 2 43 68 63 62
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.2 0 3 3 3 3
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.15 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE VI
SUCCESS RATE OF THE REVERSIBILITY ATTACK AGAINST
GRP-IOM UNDER N STOLEN TOKEN AND TEMPLATE ATTACKS
WHEN OPTIMIZATION IS PERFORMED (CASE 2), USING THE
EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE AND FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF τA .
N 1 2 3 4 5
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.33 77 71 69 69 69
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.2 4 3 3 3 3
RaterevA , τEuc = 0.15 0 0 0 0 0
V. ATTACKS ON URP-IOM
In this section, we propose some concrete attack
strategies against URP-IoM, and evaluate the impact of
our attacks through our implementation over one of the
datasets as provided in [25]. More specifically, we use
the dataset of features extracted from the fingerprint
images of FVC2002-DB1 as in [25]. This dataset
contains a total of 500 samples: 5 samples per user for
100 users.
As mentioned before, for convenient comparison of
our results, we use the parameter set n = 299,
(k,m, p) = (128, 600, 2) and τ = 0.11 as the main
reference point in our security analysis, because these
parameters are commonly referred in the security and
performance analysis of URP-IoM in [25]; see Table V
in [25].
A. Authentication attacks on URP-IoM
Finding nearby-template preimages: As before,
let x ∈ MA = Rn be a feature vector, and let
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u = Ξ.T (sp, x) ∈MB = Rm be the template generated
from x and the secret parameter set sp. Assume that
an adversary A knows u and sp. In order to find a
nearby-template preimage vector x∗ ∈ Rn, the adversary
proceeds as follows.
Since A knows sp, A can recover the set of permuta-
tions A = {σ1,i, σ2,i ∈ Sn,k, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} in URP-IoM.
The template u = (u1, u2, . . . , um) ∈ (Zk)m is a vector
comprised of the indices of maximum, i.e.
ui = argmax
l s.t. 1≤l≤k
{xσ1,i(l) · xσ2,i(l)} for i = 1 . . .m,
where k is the window size, from which the adversary
can recover the set of inequalitiesxσ1,i(j) · xσ2,i(j) ≤ xσ1,i(ui) · xσ2,i(ui)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 ≤ i ≤ m
1 ≤ j ≤ k
j 6= ui
 .
Each of these inequalities can be transformed into
linear constraints by taking the logarithm of the both
sides. The corresponding set of m × (k − 1) linear
constraints can be given as follows:log xσ1,i(j) + log xσ2,i(j)− (log xσ1,i(ui) + log xσ2,i(ui)) ≤ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 ≤ i ≤ m
1 ≤ j ≤ k
j 6= ui
 .
The logarithm adds a new set of n constraints, namely
xi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n where n is the size of the feature
vector. A finds a solution c∗ of this system, and sets x∗
such that xi∗ = exp(ci∗), i = 1, ..., n, to be one of the
(arbitrary) solutions of this system. By the construction
of x∗, we must have u∗ = Ξ.T (sp, x∗) = Ξ.T (sp, x) =
u, and so Ξ.V(u, u∗, τB) = True, for all τB . In other
words, A is expected to get (falsely) authenticated by the
server with 100%, or equivalently, RateAuthA = 100%.
The expected success rate of our attack has been
verified in our python implementation using the cvxopt
library [28] on a computer running on Ubuntu 17.10 with
xfce environment, with an i7 4790k 4 Ghz processor,
an 8 GB of RAM, a SATA SSD of 512GB. The attack
runs in the order of seconds for the parameters for the
parameters n = 299, (k,m, p) = (128, 600, 2) and
τ = 0.11. We should note that, if an adversary captures
more than one token and template pair, then additional
constraints can further optimize the attack as previously
discussed for GRP-IoM.
Finding long-lived nearby-template preimages:
Let x and x′ be two feature vectors of the same user,
and sp and sp′ two secret parameters sets. Let u =
Ξ.T (sp, x) and u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′). In finding a long-
lived nearby-template preimage x∗ of u′, we assume
that the adversary A knows u, sp, sp′. In our proposed
attack, A follows the previously described strategy to
find a nearby-template preimage x∗ based on u and sp,
and presents this x∗ as a candidate for nearby-template
preimage of u′.
We evaluate this attack by computing both the average
and the minimum matching score, over one hundred
users, between u′∗ = Ξ.T (sp′, x∗) and the re-enrolled
genuine template u′ = Ξ.T (sp′, x′). Our experiments
yield 25.2% as the average rate of the number of
indices with the same entry in u′ and u′∗; and 3%
as the minimum rate of the number of indices with
the same entry in u′ and u′∗. Therefore, given the
matching score thresholds of τ = 0.11 as set in [25],
we expect that the success rate of the adversary to be
RateAuth−``A = 100%, on average. The above attack
strategies show that URP-IoM is severely vulnerable
against authentication attacks under the stolen token and
template attack model, and also show that adversaries
cannot be prevented by renewing templates or tokens. In
other words, the cancalleability feature of GRP-IoM is
violated under the stolen token and template scenario.
Optimizing authentication attacks: Similar to
our GRP-IoM analysis, we now explore whether the
attacks can be optimized when a user leaks several token
and template pairs. More specifically, assume that an
adversary captures N token, template pairs (spi, u(i)),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , derived from the same feature vector x.
Assume further that the adversary is in the possession of
another token spN+1, but not the template u(N+1), from
the (N + 1)’st enrollment of the user with same feature
vector x.
Table VII reports the values when the number of leaks
increases, and shows that 2 stolen token and template
pairs are sufficient to yield RateAuth−``A = 100% when
τ = 0.11.
TABLE VII
MATCHING SCORES USING AURPAC .
N 2 3 4
Constraint Number
(N · (k − 1) ·m+ 2 · n) 152,998 229,198 305,398
URP Match. Score – Min (%) 12.8 14.7 14.8
URP Match. Score – Avg (%) 28.2 29.6 31.3
VI. LINKABILITY ATTACKS ON GRP-IOM AND
URP-IOM
Recall that an adversary A in a linkability attack can
be modelled as an algorithm that takes sp, sp′, u, and
u′ as input, and that outputs 0 or 1, where the output 1
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indicates that the feature vectors x and x′ are extracted
from the same user, and the output 0 indicates that the
feature vectors x and x′ are extracted from two different
users.
Authentication attacks on GRP-IoM and URP-IoM
only return a feature vector that enables successful (false)
authentication. Reversibility attacks on GRP-IoM allows
to construct a nearby-feature preimage vectors, that are
somewhat close to the actual feature vector. For example,
in the exact reversibility attack on GRP-IoM, we were
able to guess the sign of a component of the actual
feature vector with estimated probability of 242/299.
In our linkability attack on GRP-IoM, we utilize such
sign guessing, and partial reversibility results. However,
we could not obtain nearby-feature preimage vectors
in URP-IoM successfully, mainly because, by the use
of geometric programming, all of the components in
a preimage must be non-negative, whereas an actual
feature vector component can well be negative. As a
result, the linkability attack techniques for GRP-IoM do
not immediately apply to attack URP-IoM. However, we
show that it is still possible to successfully link URP-
IoM templates.
a) An attack on GRP-IoM: Given sp, sp′, u, and u′,
the adversary computes nearby-feature preimage vectors
x∗ and x′∗ as explained before. For some decision
threshold value tlink, the adversary computes β =
β(x∗, x′∗), where β is the number of indices for which
x∗ and x′∗ have exactly the same sign. Finally, the
adversary outputs 1, if β ≥ tlink, indicating that the
feature vectors x and x′ are extracted from the same
user. Otherwise, if β < tlink, the adversary outputs 0,
indicating that the feature vectors x and x′ are extracted
from two different users.
In our experiments, we created 500 nearby-feature
preimages, derived from the 500 templates along with
their 500 seeds. Recall that the templates are the trans-
formations (using distinct random seeds) of the feature
vectors provided by the authors of IoM hashing [25].
Using our dataset of nearby-feature preimages (estimated
feature vectors) produced by our attack, we estimate the
success rate of our attack using the following script:
1) c1, c2 ← 0
2) for i between 1 and N :
a) pick at random two nearby-feature preimage
vectors x∗ and x′∗ from the same individual
(x∗ 6= x′∗).
b) if β(x∗, x′∗) ≥ tlink : c1 ← c1 + 1.
c) pick at random two nearby-feature preimage
vectors x∗ and x′∗ from two different indi-
viduals.
d) if β(x∗, x′∗) < tlink : c2 ← c2 + 1.
3) return c1/N and c2/N .
In our experiments, we set tlink = 170 and N = 10000,
and obtained c1/N ≈ 0.95 and c2/N ≈ 0.99. Therefore,
we estimate that RateLinkA = 0.97, as the average of the
success rates over the genuine and imposter pairs. The
run time of the attack is dominated by the run time of
computing nearby-feature preimages, that takes only a
few seconds as mentioned earlier.
b) An attack on URP-IoM: Given sp, sp′, u, and u′,
the adversary computes nearby-feature preimage vectors
x∗ and x′∗ as explained before. For some decision
threshold value tlink, the adversary computes the Pear-
son coefficient ρ = ρ(x∗, x′∗) ∈ [−1, 1] of x∗ and
x′∗. The formula for the Pearson coefficient is given as
follows:
ρ(x, y) =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
,
where x = (x1, ..., xn), y = (y1, ..., yn), x¯ =∑n
i=1 xi/n, and y¯ =
∑n
i=1 yi/n.
The adversary outputs 1, if |ρ| ≥ tlink, indicating that
the feature vectors x and x′ are extracted from the same
user. Otherwise, if |ρ| < tlink, the adversary outputs 0,
indicating that the feature vectors x and x′ are extracted
from two different users. Following the linkability attack
on GRP-IoM, we estimate the success rate of our attack
using the following script:
1) c1, c2 ← 0
2) for i between 1 and N :
a) pick at random two nearby-feature preimage
vectors x∗ and x′∗ from the same individual
(x∗ 6= x′∗)
b) if |ρ(x∗, x′∗)| ≥ tlink : c1 ← c1 + 1.
c) pick at random two nearby-feature preimage
vectors x∗ and x′∗ from two different indi-
viduals.
d) if |ρ(x∗, x′∗)| < tlink : c2 ← c2 + 1.
3) return c1/N and c2/N .
In our experiments, we set tlink = 0.18 and N = 10000,
and obtained c1/N ≈ 0.83 and c2/N ≈ 0.83. Therefore,
we estimate that RateLinkA = 0.83, as the average of the
success rates over the genuine and imposter pairs. The
run time of the attack is dominated by the run time of
computing nearby-feature preimages, that takes only a
few seconds as mentioned earlier.
VII. CONCLUSION
We formalized the authentication, irreversibility and
unlikability notions under the stolen token scenario, and
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proposed several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-
IoM. We argued that both schemes are severely vul-
nerable against authentication and linkability attacks.
Based on our experimental results, we estimated 100%
success rate for our authentication attacks against GRP-
IoM and URP-IoM, 97% success rate for our linkability
attacks against GRP-IoM, and 83% success rate for our
linkability attacks against URP-IoM. We also proposed
better reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM, but they are
not practical yet.
We believe that our attacks can further be improved.
One interesting research direction would be to see the
impact of different choices of objective functions in
modelling the optimization problems in the authenti-
cation and reversibility attacks. Similarly, it would be
interesting to exploit different correlation metrics in the
linkability attacks.
Finally, we assume that adversaries are not adaptive
and they are not allowed to ask queries for data of
their choices in our attack models. This is rather a
weak adversarial model. Therefore, we expect that our
attacks can further be improved by allowing stronger
adversaries.
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